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DDI- 4399-83/

16 JUN
1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: The "Red Team"

1. This memorandum responds to your request of 7 June about the feasibility and desirability of a Red Team to closely follow the START negotiations and come up with judgments on what the Soviets would do and how they would react to various changes in the U.S. negotiating posture.

2. In a nutshell, a Red Team to address negotiating issues is desirable and feasible. The key question is whether such a Red Team should come from within the government or be comprised of individuals from outside the government.

3. The Intelligence Community performed this Red Team function from 1969 through 1980. Those working arms control from a policy standpoint in this administration, however, have had little interest in issues of negotiability and Soviet reactions. They have not often asked us for our assessment of negotiability and Soviet reactions although we have occasionally provided such assessments on our own initiative. Normally, however, we have been rebuffed when we raised these issues.

4. There is no question that the idea of a Red Team would be an extremely useful addition to standard interagency analyses on START and INF issues. By the same token, to be effective, such analysis would have to deal with Soviet attitudes and objectives in the broadest sense, not just in the narrow context of specific U.S. negotiating options.

5. I believe that in your capacity as DCI you should strongly urge that the Red Team be comprised of representatives of the Intelligence Community at an appropriate level. Either Larry Gershwin appropriately could chair such a group. Other candidates are available as well. Such a group might comprise a Chairman and no more than five or six members, perhaps drawn from CIA, DIA and INR.

6. I believe that a Red Team comprised of outsiders, very frankly, would end up not being very helpful to an administration that is looking for serious, practical help. We have talked many times before that many Soviet specialists on the outside are ideological at one extreme or another and that

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those few who are not generally do not have much time for intelligence-related work. I worry a great deal that a Red Team comprised of the likes of say, a Richard Pipes, Sy Weiss, Mose Harvey and so on would end up preparing tracts that would not identify opportunities as well as dangers. In short, the best opportunity for a Red Team that will be genuinely helpful and perform a responsible role would be for it to come from the Intelligence Community. It also is a legitimate, even required, function of the Intelligence Community.

[redacted]

7. I believe this group should report to you and that its product should go at a minimum to Judge Clark, the Chief Negotiators and to the other NSC principals who deal with START and INF. The group could have as part of its membership one or two outsiders who have had some experience in arms control and negotiating with the Soviets.

[redacted]

8. In sum, I suggest that you wholeheartedly endorse the idea of a Red Team as raised by Ken Adelman to follow closely the START negotiations and come up with judgments on what the Soviets would do and how they would react to various changes in the U.S. negotiating posture. I further believe you should make a strong pitch that this should be undertaken by the Intelligence Community as the place most likely to provide both the continuity of experience in dealing with the Soviets (we have been providing support to negotiators along these lines for 14 years -- never mind how little they have followed our advice) and can begin providing help promptly. It also would assure both objective and realistic analysis that could at the same time be practical and helpful.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates

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
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7 June 1983

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7 June 1983


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START, 7 June 1983

1. At the START meeting this morning, Ken Adelman suggested that a red team should be created to closely follow the START negotiations and come up with judgments on what the Soviets would do and how they would react to various changes in the US negotiating posture.

2. I'd like your judgment on the feasibility and desirability of this.


William J. Casey

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